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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2306
___________
THOMAS M. BOLICK,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; CHUCK COBAUGH, State Trooper;
STATE TROOPER JOHN AND JANE DOE; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY;
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; ANTHONY J.
ROSINI, District Attorney; JOHN P. MUNCER, ESQ., Assistant District Attorney;
GEORGE NAGLE, ESQ., Public Defender; PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE OF
NORTHUMBERLAND
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-01461)
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR. and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 29, 2012 )
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________

PER CURIAM.
Thomas M. Bolick appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and from
a subsequent order denying reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only summarize the facts and
procedural history of this case. Bolick was represented by counsel in the District Court.
In an amended complaint, he alleged that he was “fraudulently convicted and sentenced”
in 1981 in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, after pleading guilty to a charge of
robbery. In 2007, long after his ten-year maximum sentence had expired, Bolick filed
various pleadings in the trial court, including a proposed order seeking to vacate/strike
the 1981 conviction. Despite having rejected Bolick’s related submissions, Judge Robert
B. Sacavage signed and filed the proposed order in June 2007. The order stated that the
1981 judgment “is void on its face for lack of jurisdiction due to fraud upon the court.”
Bolick alleges that Judge Sacavage thereafter had an ex parte conference with
Chuck Cobaugh, an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police. (Bolick had informed
the State Police of the court’s order in an effort to clear his criminal record.) Judge
Sacavage then filed an order in November 2007 vacating his June 2007 order. Judge
Sacavage explained that the June order was “inadvertently signed,” that he had “intended
to deny [Bolick’s] Proposed Order,” and that he had “previously disposed of this issue”
by entering an order in May 2007 denying Bolick’s petition to strike/open the conviction.
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Bolick appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which held that Judge
Sacavage’s June and November orders were both “legal nullities” because the time in
which to modify the earlier order denying Bolick’s petition to strike/open had expired.
The Superior Court thus quashed Bolick’s appeal and remanded for the trial court to
vacate the June and November orders and to reinstate a May 25, 2007, order denying
Bolick’s petition to strike/open the 1981 judgment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied Bolick’s petition for allowance of appeal.
In the present suit, Bolick complains that the “fraudulent” 1981 conviction
remains on his criminal record, that the conviction “no longer exists” in light of Judge
Sacavage’s June 2007 order, and that certain defendants conspired to violate his rights in
connection with the alleged ex parte conference with Judge Sacavage. Bolick sought
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as damages based on state-law claims of false
reports, defamation, and civil conspiracy.
The District Court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denied Bolick’s motion for a default
judgment against Northumberland County. The District Court noted that Bolick agreed
to the dismissal of his claims against the following defendants: the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania State Police; the Northumberland County Public
Defender’s Officer; George Nagle; and the Northumberland County District Attorney’s
Office.
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As to the remaining defendants – Cobaugh, Anthony J. Rosini, John P. Muncer
(Rosini and Muncer are prosecutors), and Northumberland County – the District Court
held that Bolick failed to state a viable claim for relief under federal or state law. Among
other things, the District Court observed that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
bars any § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 1981 conviction,
that the public record contradicts Bolick’s assertion that his 1981 conviction is invalid,
thereby undermining many of his claims, and that Bolick failed to point to a policy or
custom to support a municipal liability claim against Northumberland County. After the
District Court denied Bolick’s timely filed motion for reconsideration, Bolick timely filed
a pro se notice of appeal.
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Our review of a district
court’s order of dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, is plenary and we apply the same test as the
district court.” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir.
2000). “We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, but
we review the District Court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and factual
determinations for clear error.” Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc.,
602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).
As a preliminary matter, it is clear that Bolick, through his counsel, expressly
waived all claims against several defendants in response to the motions to dismiss.
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Consequently, the only issues properly raised on appeal concern the four remaining
defendants: Cobaugh, Rosini, Muncer, and Northumberland County. Furthermore, as to
Rosini and Muncer, Bolick waived his § 1983 claims, and as to Northumberland County,
he waived his state-law claims. We review only those claims that Bolick did not waive in
the District Court.
Turning to the merits, we discern no error in the District Court’s analysis and fully
agree with its reasons for holding that Bolick failed to state a federal or state-law claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Bolick contends that the District Court erred by not accepting as true his
contentions that the 1981 conviction is “fraudulent” and that it was “invalidated” by
Judge Sacavage’s June 2007 order. However, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a
court is permitted to look to matters of public record, including “criminal case
dispositions,” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,
1197 (3d Cir. 1993), and “a prior judicial opinion.” McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577
F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court here properly took note of the public
record regarding Bolick’s 1981 conviction, including the Superior Court’s ruling that
Judge Sacavage’s June 2007 order is a “legal nullity.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, Bolick had to plead “facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To the extent that Bolick’s claims hinge upon the untenable assertion that his 1981
conviction is somehow invalid or fraudulent, those claims do not pass the plausibility
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test. And while Bolick insists that the Superior Court improperly vacated Judge
Sacavage’s June 2007 order, see, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 9-11, the fact remains that the
Superior Court did vacate the June 2007 order, and therefore the 1981 conviction
undoubtedly still stands. On this record, we are satisfied that the District Court did not
err in its application of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
We also agree with the District Court that Bolick’s § 1983 claims are barred at
least in part under Heck to the extent that a judgment in Bolick’s favor would necessarily
imply the invalidity of the 1981 conviction. As the Court held in Heck, “to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional ... harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” 512 U.S. at 486-87
(footnote omitted, emphasis added). As mentioned, the Superior Court held that Judge
Sacavage’s June 2007 order was unauthorized, and therefore Bolick’s conviction remains
valid for purposes of the Heck rule.
III.
We have considered Bolick’s remaining arguments, including any challenge that
he may be raising to the denial of his motion for reconsideration, but we find those
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arguments without merit and in need of no separate discussion. We will affirm the

District Court’s judgment. 1

1

Bolick’s motion to strike the brief of appellees Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
et al., is denied. Contrary to Bolick’s contention, the Clerk granted appellees’
motion for an extension of time, and appellees filed their brief within the time
permitted. While appellees did not initially submit a certificate of service with the
brief, they promptly filed a certificate after the Clerk notified them of the
deficiency.
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